Anneke van Baalen, HIDDEN MASCULINITY, Max Weber's historical sociology of bureaucracy. 1994
Chapter 6. Feudalism. Decentralization of patrimonialism into political domination by an hierarchy of
free men
105
is bound as well: in his view the feudal system is a whole ('Gebilde') of subjective 'rights'
('Rechte'), and not of objective 'laws'.
38
This subjective 'Rechtsstaat' also brings with it a
'separation of powers', but here it is quantitative, not qualitative.
39
According to Weber feudal lords generally could stabilize and expand their power in two
ways: they could either centralize the feudal system by limiting or forbidding subinfeudation,
or they could try to create or recreate a centralized patrimonialism by appointing patrimonial
officials. The former process took place in England, the latter on the European continent.
Because Weber attaches considerable political and social consequences to the
centralization of the feudal system in England, especially, as we saw in my chapter on
patrimonialism, with regard to its influence on the formation of semi-feudal status groups of
officials, I will discuss this development first.
6. England: centralized feudalism and rule by honoratiores; justices of the peace and
gentlemen
William the Conqueror introduced the Norman centralized feudal system in England. This
meant that in England 'all subvassals were directly oath-bound to the king and considered
his men.'
40
A centralized feudal system can best be instituted on conquered territories.
41
Since it is
much more powerful than a decentralized one, it makes a patrimonial bureaucracy almost
superfluous; moreover, no patrimonial bureaucracy developed in England because the
English rulers did not need a standing army for the defence of their island. Neither did they
have a fiscal need for one. They only possessed a small centralized administration.
42
As a consequence the position of the local landlords in England - and, as we will see later,
that of the cities as well - was much stronger than that of their counterparts on the continent.
Landlords ruled as 'honoratiores', 'notables'.
The place of the concept 'rule by honoratiores' in the whole of Weber's analysis of
domination is not very clear. As he formulates it himself:
'In itself the authority of honoratiores differs greatly in basis, quality, and impact
.'
43
According to Weber domination by honoratiores differs from patriarchal domination in only
one respect: property, education or style of life made their social honor ('prestige') the basis
of their domination; this domination thus differs from patriarchal domination in its lack of 'the
specific personal loyalty - children's and servants' piety' of the unfree servants.
'Honoratiores' are therefore members of a positive status group, who rule over others beside
('Herrengewalt') is precarious. This is because it is very dependent on the voluntary obedience and hence the
purely personal loyalty of the members of the administrative staff, who, by virtue of the feudal structure, are
themselves in possession of the means of administration. Hence, the latent struggle for authority becomes
chronic between the lord and his vassal, and the ideal extent of feudal authority has never been effectively
carried out in practice or remained effective on a permanent basis', ES p. 257, WG p. 150.
38
ES p. 1082, WG p. 634. This concept is translated by 'constitutional government' or 'polity of Estates' (p. 1086);
Weber's pun is therefore lost.
39
The idea of the social contract (Staatsvertrag), 'which led to constitutionalism, is anticipated in a primitive
fashion'.
40
ES p. 1080, WG p. 632.
41
as Arabian, Sassanid and Turkish military states did, and also the Catholic church in Occidental mission
territory: ES p. 1135, WG 671.
42
See also below Ch. 8,7.
43
ES p. 1009, WG p. 582.
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