Anneke van Baalen, HIDDEN MASCULINITY, Max Weber's historical sociology of bureaucracy. 1994
Chapter 6. Feudalism. Decentralization of patrimonialism into political domination by an hierarchy of
free men
106
their own patriarchal dependents; their domination therefore is routinized-charismatic in
character - as, in my interpretation, all patriarchal domination is.
For the treatment of his concept of honoratiores Weber himself refers only to the sections I
will discuss now; they could be further connected with his treatment of compulsory liturgical
associations.
44
Rule by honoratiores according to Weber was strongest in the Occident after the
disintegration of the Roman Empire when a patrimonial ruler could only try to eliminate the
notables, if he had an administrative staff of his own to replace them.
45
He needed the
honoratiores for his local administration; since they wanted to exploit the economic capacity
of their retainers themselves, they demanded immunity from interference with the execution
of their own patrimonial power over their retainers on the part of the ruler's administrative
officials in return for their services.
46
The medieval patrimonial rulers, lacking a bureaucratic apparatus, had to make even more
compromises than the Roman emperors. Both in England and in Prussia they had to
concede 'that the ruler's local official be an owner of landed property in the district and that
he be taken from the stratum of local land-owning notables.'
47
Some of the most powerful of
the medieval barons even usurped the office patronage of large areas. The local landlords
therefore tried to sever the direct relationship between ruler and common subjects by
attempting to monopolize the offices and to make them hereditary.
48
The prince tried to retain fiscal and military interests in his subjects; in order to be able to do
so, however, he had to prevent the landlords from exploiting the peasants so cruelly that
their numbers dwindled. If he did not have a strong administrative staff, he could associate
with another group of honoratiores, who could keep the great patrimonial lords in check. This
is the process which took place in England; according to Weber it accounts for the reason
why the English administrative system developed in such a different way. The institute which
was created there was that of the 'justice of the peace'.
49
The task of a 'justice of the peace' was to 'police', in the old-fashioned sense of the word: to
maintain a public security which was increasingly indispensable in an expanding market
economy, and to order trades and consumption. He also had to deal with unemployment and
rising food prices, which were the consequences of a market economy.
The Crown in England succeeded in pushing aside the patrimonial and feudal authorities,
recruiting local notables from the 'gentry', landowners with a knightly lifestyle, for those new
offices. The Crown retained the right to appoint them, but the gentry acquired a monopoly of
the office.
50
44
See above, Ch. 5,2.
45
ES p. 1055, WG p. 614.
46
ES p. 1056, WG p. 615.
47
ES p. 1057, WG p. 615.
48
Ibid. They tried 'to "mediatize" all subjects of the patrimonial ruler, to interpose the local honoratiores as the
sole occupants of all political offices, to cut off the direct relationship between ruler and common subjects and to
direct both exclusively to the local office incumbent for their respective claims - for taxes and military service, on
the one hand, and for legal protection on the other. This was a trend toward the elimination of any control on the
part of the ruler and toward the hereditary appropriation of the political office by a family, legally or in fact, or at
least by a monopolistic group of local honoratiores.'
49
ES p. 1059, WG p. 616.
50
ES p. 1060, WG p. 617.
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